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Abstract
Two issues are addressed in this paper. First, we attempt to ascertain whether the current
fiscal policy in Spain satisfies the intertemporal borrowing constraint. For this purpose, we
apply the traditional empirical tests of sustainability proposed in the literature, that pay
special attention to integration orders of deficit and debt processes and the existence of
cointegration relationships between revenues and expenditures. Under this approach, a
sustainable fiscal policy would indicate that if fiscal variables follow the pattern of the past in
the future, no problems in marketing public debt are expected to arise. Our results show that
a structural break seems to have taken place gradually in the Spanish budget performance,
which allows to verify the intertemporal borrowing constraint in a “strong sense”.
Second, given the limitations of the previous sustainability analysis, the fact that the change
to strong sustainability is not fully confirmed for a large sample period and that, even if this
were the case, the Stability and Growth Pact for the EMU countries sets explicit ceilings to
public finance that might require additional consolidation efforts in Spain, we consider the
issue of which is the most efficient strategy to achieve permanent reductions in fiscal
deficits. Thus, we analyse empirically the possible interdependence between government
expenditure and revenues. We examine this issue by performing the standard Granger
causality tests. We find that there is a bias towards deficit in public sector's size and that
public expenditure causes revenues in the short and long term, whereas revenues only
cause expenditures in the long term. These results imply that fiscal consolidation could be
achieved with a reduction in the size of the public sector and that the most adequate
strategy of fiscal consolidation should consist on the reduction of structural public
expenditure.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The most common definition of fiscal sustainability, and that employed in this
paper, is based on the need for a fiscal deficit to be financed, i.e. on the concept of
inter-temporal budget constraint, which requires that the current market value of debt
be equal to the discounted sum of expected future primary surpluses. In this context,
fiscal policy is sustainable if the discounted value of debt reaches zero at the limit.
The issue of whether the current fiscal policy can be maintained indefinitely, i.e.
whether it is sustainable or not, is an important one, since it will determine the need for
future discretionary policy actions. In this sense, since the concept of sustainability
relies on the fact that governments need enough resources to ensure their ability to
carry out the functions attributed to them, sustainability analysis helps to determine
whether a current policy can be maintained in the long run with the ongoing ability to
generate financial resources. In addition, fiscal sustainability has clear implications for
other macroeconomic variables. In particular, a non-sustainable fiscal policy involves a
risk of future interest rate rises leading to a slowdown in economic growth.
This need for fiscal sustainability and, in the case of EMU countries, the
commitment to meet the fiscal targets set out in the Stability and Growth Pact, might
require the correction of fiscal imbalances. In this sense, knowing the causes of fiscal
deficits seems crucial to guarantee permanent reductions in fiscal deficits. In other
words, the possible interdependence between government expenditure and revenues,
should be analysed in order to select the adequate strategy of fiscal consolidation.
Thus, the central issue is whether higher taxes lead to expenditure changes or whether
expenditure growth leads budget dynamics, with taxes following suit.
In this paper, we address these two issues, sustainability of public finances and
causality between public revenues and expenditures, for the case of Spain. Testing
sustainability and causality in the Spanish case is of particular relevance due to the fact
that several policy actions have been adopted in Spain since 1975, aimed at
implementing a European Welfare State model and a modern tax system. This has led
to a sharp increase in public expenditure and revenue. Furthermore, in recent times,
Spain has gradually reduced its public deficit mainly as a result of a drop in spending
that might have important consequences for fiscal sustainability.
First, as regards sustainability analysis, different tests are proposed in the
literature. These pay special attention to integration orders of deficit and debt
processes, and to the underlying stochastic structures and the existence of
cointegration relationships between revenues and expenditures. Earlier tests in this
literature indicated that the condition for fiscal sustainability is the stationarity of the
debt (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986) or that the discounted debt process follows an I(0)
process without drift (Wilcox, 1989)1. Later work developed alternative conditions for
fiscal sustainability: provided that total public revenue and expenditure are first-order
integrated, sustainability requires both series to be cointegrated (Hakkio and Rush
(1991), Haug (1991), Smith and Zin (1991), Trehan and Walsh (1988,1991)). More
recently, Quintos (1995) extended this literature by introducing “strong” and “weak”
conditions for fiscal sustainability. The “strong” condition corresponds to the stationarity
of the deficit process, while the “weak” condition verifies for higher than one orders of
integration of the public debt, or even for some mildly explosive processes for this
                                                
1  Wickens and Uctum (1993) develop a test for sustainability when a feedback rule between the deficit
and debt is introduced.
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variable, implying the intertemporal borrowing constraint is sastified but at a slower rate
than in the stronger version.
From an economic point of view, there are important differences between the
concepts of strong and weak sustainability2. Strong sustainability is understood as a
situation in which no future problems in the deficit’s behaviour are expected to arise,
and there is therefore no need for structural fiscal reforms, in the absence of significant
changes in the processes followed by both public expenditures and revenues.
However, weak sustainability implies that governments might have future problems in
marketing their debt, involving a substantial risk of a rise in interest rates that may have
perverse effects on economic growth and the public budget, necessitating fiscal
reforms, or at least a consolidation effort. This possibility of future debt-marketing
problems comes from the lower speed at which the intertemporal borrowing constraint
is satisfied, as a consequence of the higher growth rate of the debt and, consequently
the higher level for this variable in future years. Accordingly, the difference between
both concepts of sustainability is quite relevant, both from a positive and normative
analysis of fiscal policy developments, in that weak sustainability can be taken as an
indicator of the need for fiscal consolidation. On the other hand, the relevance of both
concepts of sustainability is of great interest for the associated consequences for the
macroeconomic variables of interest implied in both definitions.
Camarero et al. (1998) apply the aforementioned tests to the Spanish case,
showing that public revenues and expenditures are cointegrated only when the
possibility of structural shifts in this relationship is taken into account. According to their
analysis, the deficit process is found to be sustainable in the weak sense. However,
since over the sample period many fiscal reforms have taken place in Spain, a deeper
univariate analysis of the series involved might be of great interest and may provide
useful information for deriving sounder conclusions about the sustainability of Spanish
fiscal policy in recent years. In this context, the existence of changes in the order of
integration, which can be associated with fiscal reforms or with gradual fiscal
adjustments, might modify previous results and thus our conclusions. For this reason,
in this paper we apply the traditional tests of sustainability, following Quintos´
approach. In addition, we introduce a univariate analysis of the series, consisting of
testing whether the series have undergone changes in the order of integration that
may, in some way, vary or even invalidate the cointegration analysis.
Second, as regards the interdependence between revenues and expenditure,
theoretical arguments give support to any possible direction of causality. For instance,
Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argue that a deficit financing facilitates higher spending
due to the existence of fiscal illusion; Brennan and Buchanan (1980) suggest that in a
leviathan-type government higher taxes today lead to more spending tomorrow; Barro
(1979) and Peacock and Wiseman (1979) contend that increases in expenditure in the
present tend to be followed by tax increases in the future; Other authors support the
hypothesis of interdependence between revenues and expenditure, initially posed by
Wicksell (1896) and reformulated by Musgrave (1966) and Meltzer and Richard (1981).
This theory predicts that decisions on both variables are adopted and suffered by the
same groups, so they will be jointly and interdependently adopted. Empirical evidence
is also far from conclusive. Some studies have reported results showing that revenues
cause expenditure (Manage and Marlow, 1986; Blackley; 1986) while some others
support the opposite conclusion (Anderson, Wallace and Warner, 1986; von
                                                
2  In the context of this paper a sustainability analysis makes sense under the existence of positive debt
and persistent deficits. Conversely, under an excess of assets over liabilities and persistent surplus
sustainability is, by definition, always guarantied.
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Furstenberg, Green and Jeong; 1986) and some searchers have found a bidirectional
causality (Owoye, 1995)3.
In this paper, we examine empirically the issue of causality between general
government revenues and expenditure in Spain by performing the Granger causality
test, allowing or not for cointegration, and by means of the variance decomposition and
impulse response functions in the context of a VAR analysis.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of
fiscal policy performance during the sample period (1964-1998), which may be of
particular interest for better understanding the results. Section 3 and 4 contains the
sustainability and causality analysis, respectively. Section 5 draws the conclusions.
2. DEFICIT AND DEBT IN SPAIN4
Since 1964, five distinct periods can be identified in relation to public finances in
Spain:
1964-75: a period of strong economic expansion, with average real GDP growth
of 6.4%, characterised by small budget surpluses, owing to the steady growth of
government revenue and expenditure.
1975-85: against a background of economic crisis and political change, the
previous situation changed in 1976, with the appearance of a budget deficit. Although it
was small in the first two years, it grew continuously, except in 1979 and 1983, to reach
5.8% of GDP in 1985. On the one hand, public expenditure as a percentage of GDP
almost doubled in this period (from 23.5% of GDP in 1974 to 41.6% en 1985, which
represents an average annual increase of 1.6% of GDP) due to low economic growth
(average real GDP growth  of 1.6%) and the building of the Welfare State. On the other
hand, public revenues also increased significantly as a consequence of the 1977 and
1978 fiscal reforms, but at lower rates than in the case of expenditure (total revenues
moved from 23.6% of GDP in 1974 to 35.8% en 1985, which represents an average
annual growth of 1% of GDP).
As a consequence of this budgetary imbalance, public debt also spiralled, from
12.1% of GDP in 1979 to 43.7% in 1985. However, this increase in debt did not lead to
a similar rise in the interest burden because, until 1982, around two-thirds of the budget
deficit was funded by the Banco de España and financial institutions, primarily through
compulsory reserve requirements. In fact, public debt assumed by the private and
external sectors under orthodox financing arrangements played a very limited role,
covering less than 25% of the state-borrowing requirement. Nonetheless, as from
1983, the deficit was funded in a more orthodox fashion, and the government came to
rely more heavily on Treasury bill issuance. This, together with the high interest rates
prevailing in the period, caused the interest burden to double as a proportion of GDP
between 1982 and 1985 (to 2% in 1985).
1986 to 1988: following Spain's accession to the European Community and the
commencement of a new cyclical expansion, there was a change in direction in
                                                
3  Payne (1998) examines the relationship between revenues and expenditures for USA and finds that the
argument that tax cause expending is supported for 24 states, while the opposite conclusion is supported
for 8 states and a bidirectional causality is valid for 11 states.
4  See Argimón, Gómez, Hernández de Cos and Martí (1999) for a deeper analysis of fiscal policy in
Spain.
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Spanish fiscal policy. The budget deficit was reduced from 5.8% in 1985 to 3.4% in
1988, essentially due to the growth of government revenue. In fact, public revenue as a
percentage of GDP increased 2.2 percentage points while public expenditure fell by
only 0.2 percentage points. Moreover, there was a significant improvement in the
primary balance, which swung from -3.8% in 1985 to a small surplus in 1988, enabling
public debt to be whittled down to 41.7% in 1988.
1989 to 1993: the aforementioned period of fiscal restraint came to an end in
1989, when the budget deficit began to grow again, to reach 7% at the height of the
economic crisis in 1993. The primary balance followed a similar path to the deficit. After
small surpluses between 1987 and 1989, it moved into deficit in 1990, rising to 1.8% of
GDP in 1993. As regards public revenues and expenditures, similarly to the period
1975-1985, both increased significantly, reaching 42.8% and 49.8% of GDP,
respectively, in 1993. Finally, there was only a slight increase in public debt, to 45.9%
of GDP, primarily as a consequence of the strong growth in GDP between 1989 and
1991 (11% in nominal terms), and despite the increase in the cost of debt during this
period. Thereafter, however, it rose to exceed 60% of GDP in 1993, as a consequence
of the increase in the budget deficits, the fall in nominal GDP growth and the prohibition
on monetary financing of the deficit as from 1994, under the Treaty on European
Union. At the same time, the interest burden rose, reaching 5.2% of GDP in 1993.
1994 to 1998: fiscal policy was constrained in this period by the commitment to
meet the convergence criteria set out in the Treaty on European Union to regulate
access to the Third Stage of EMU. In accordance with this commitment, the tendency
to imbalance in public finances came to an end in 1994, with a moderate reduction in
the deficit. However, this was reversed again in 1995, when the budget deficit reached
7.3%. Thereafter, there was a gradual decline in the deficit, which reached 1.8% in
1998, in a context of economic recovery. The reduction in the public deficit was the
result of a drop in spending, which fell by 5.7 points relative to GDP. Meanwhile, the
share in GDP of total general government revenue declined slightly.
Figure 1. Public revenues and expenditures 
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Finally, public debt peaked at over 70% of GDP in 1996 and then declined
slightly to 67.4% of GDP in 1998.  The factors responsible for this decline include the
existence of primary surpluses in 1997 and 1998, the fall in interest rates and the
revenue obtained from the privatisation of state-owned firms. Finally, interest
payments, which peaked in 1995 (at 5.6% of GDP), fell to 4.1% of GDP in 1998. This
can be explained by both the reduction in the level of public debt in 1997 and 1998 and
the decline in interest rates from 1995 (the average interest rates on Treasury bills fell
from 9.1% in 1995 to 3.7% in 1998, while those on government bonds fell from 11.1%
in 1994 to 6.4% in 1998).
The empirical results obtained in this paper are based on annual data for Spain
of public debt (bt), public deficit (dt) and public revenues (tt) and expenditure (gtR) for
the period 1964-1998 taken as ratios over GDP5. The real GDP growth rate (Dyt) and
the inflation rate (Dpt) are obtained as the first difference of the natural logs of the
original series. Usual unit root tests are carried out in appendix A at the end of the
paper. We are aware that any long-run analysis based on such a small number of
observations may be somewhat troublesome. Moreover, the well-known lack of power
of unit-root tests added to this problem obliges us to treat the results with the greatest
care. Without forgetting these difficulties, we will present our main findings in the
following sections.
                                                
5 The data employed is based on ESA79 methodology.
Figure 2. Total and primary public deficit 
-4.00
-2.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
Total deficit Primary deficit
% GDP
Source : Banco de España
BANCO DE ESPAÑA- DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 0103 7
3. SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS
3.1. Theoretical framework
As stated in the introduction, the definition of sustainability employed in this
paper is based on the concept of the fulfilment of the intertemporal borrowing constraint
of the government. In period t the budget constraint can be expressed as follows6:
ttttt TGBrB -+=D +1
with Bt being the stock of debt at the end of period t-1 in real terms, Gt real public
expenditure excluding interest payments, Tt real public revenues and rt the average
real interest rate on the debt in period t-1. Thus, the term Gt - Tt is defined as the
primary deficit. Accordingly, total public expenditures are
ttt
R
t GBrG +=
Therefore, public deficit is defined as t
R
tt TGD -= . However, the latter variables
are not the most accurate ones in a sustainability analysis. In fact, few or no conclusive
results can be drawn from variables that show an upward trend if the economy shows a
similar pattern. In other words, the relevant variables must be considered by taking into
account the size of the economy, and any sustainability analysis should thus be
performed using the latter variables as percentages of GDP and focusing on the
burden that public debt imposes on the economy. Therefore, the budget constraint in
period t and the definition of total public expenditures, both in GDP terms7, are now
ttttt tgbb -+=D + l1 [1]
ttt
R
t gbg += l
where 
t
tt
t h
hr
+
-
=
1
l , which can be understood as the addition to net debt due to the
excess of the real interest rate over ht , the real GDP growth rate. Taking the excess of
the real interest rate over the growth rate of the economy as stationary around a mean
l8, [1] can be expressed as
tttt tgxbb -+=D + l1 [2]
where tttt bggx )( ll -+= . Solving forward [2], we obtain
å
¥
=
+-+
++
+
¥®
++
+ +=+-=
0
)1(1j
1
11 )1(    ;     )(
j
j
jt
j
j
jtjt
j
t blimgxtb lggg [3]
                                                
6  In this paper, seigniorage is not considered as a source of public revenues since the current institutional
framework in EMU avoids the possibility of deficit financing through monetisation. Nevertheless, we are
aware that, in the sample period of analysis, the fiscal policy has been often conducted by extensive use of
seigniorage.
7 The lower case letters indicate the same concepts in terms of GDP.
8  If lt  is always negative the deficit process is sustainable and such an analysis would lack of relevance.
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Equation [2] and its implication [3] cannot be a subject of controversy, for they
only summarize definitions of fiscal policy. As Hamilton and Flavin (1986) point out,
what is of economic interest and subject to empirical refutation is what the creditors
expect about the behaviour of bubble term in [3]. Taking expectations in this equation,
the hypothesis that the government is subject to the intertemporal borrowing constraint
can be expressed as
å
¥
=
++
+ -=
0
1  )(
j
jtjt
j
tt gxtEb g
which is mathematically equivalent to the transversality condition 01
1 =++
+
¥®
jt
j
j
t blimE g .
Such transversality condition has a very well defined economic sense. It implies that,
for a process to be sustainable, the current debt must equal the expected present value
of future primary surpluses. Otherwise, stabilisation measures will be required in order
to coax the public deficit back to a sustainable path.
Our empirical testing requires using the representation of [3] in terms of Dbt,
which yields to the following expression:
.)(
0
1
11å
¥
=
++
+
¥®
++
+ D+D-D=-
j
jt
j
j
jtjt
j
t
R
t blimgxttg gg [4]
where the left-hand side of [4] represents the public deficit. In order to impose a
constraint analogous to the intertemporal borrowing constraint faced by an individual
the following transversality condition should hold:
01
1 =D ++
+
¥®
jt
j
j
t blimE g  [5]
Sustainability tests in literature aim to verify whether this transversality condition
in the government budget constraint holds. These tests pay special attention to
integration orders of deficit and debt processes, and to the underlying stochastic
structures and the existence of cointegration relationships between revenues and
expenditures. A usual procedure consists of testing the stationarity of Dbt in various
forms, or alternatively the stationarity of t
R
t tg -  if both are I(1), according to the
method employed by Trehan and Walsh (1988). This procedure implies testing
cointegration between revenues and expenditures when the cointegrating vector (1,-1)
is imposed. An alternative procedure would be to test cointegration in
t
R
tt gt eba ++= [6]
and afterwards, test the null H0: b=1. Accordingly, the deficit would be non-sustainable
if Dbt is non-stationary, or if cointegration in [6] does not hold with cointegrating vector
(1,-1). In this case, the transversality condition holds because )1(Opbt =D  and,
accordingly, the limit term in [5] behaves as
0) exp( =-
¥®
kTlimE
Tt
[7]
where k is a positive constant and Op(·) the rate at which a stochastic sequence
converges in probability to a non-stochastic sequence. However, as Quintos (1995)
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shows, these methods only refer to sufficient conditions for sustainability. In general, it
is not necessary for Dbt to be I(0) for [5] to hold. If Dbt is I(d), being d a finite order of
integration, it verifies )( 2/dt TOpb =D . In this case, the limit term in [5] behaves as
0 ) exp( 2/ =-
¥®
d
Tt
TkTlimE [8]
This result determines that if Dbt is an integrated process of any finite order, the
discount factor decreases at a higher rate than Dbt, making the transversality condition,
and thus the intertemporal borrowing constraint, hold, although the limit term in [5]
approaches zero at a lower speed than in the case when Dbt is I(0)9. Consequently,
using Quintos’ terminology we will say that a deficit process is sustainable in its strong
form if the limit term in the transversality condition behaves as [7], whereas if this limit
behaves as [8] the process will be said to be sustainable in its weak form. Therefore,
only when Dbt contains explosive roots of high enough magnitude to offset the discount
factor will the deficit be non-sustainable.
As stated before, strong sustainability means that no future problems, according
to the current state of affairs, are likely to arise, whereas a weakly sustainable budget
performance might lead in the future to problems in debt-marketing, that would involve
a risk of interest rates increases. This risk only arises because of the higher stock of
debt that a weakly sustainable fiscal policy would imply. Should debt-marketing
problems  occur, macroeconomic stability would be endangered and severe fiscal
reforms should be adopted.
In this context, Quintos shows that b=1 in [6] is only a sufficient condition for
sustainability, in that it implies that the transversality condition behaves as [7].
However, it is not a necessary condition. Therefore, the necessary and sufficient
condition is 0<b£1, whereas cointegration is only a sufficient condition. Substituting [6]
in [1] we obtain
ttttt gbb eabbl ---+-+=+ )1())1(1(1 [9]
or equivalently
.)1()1()1(1 t
R
tttttt ggbb eabeabbl ---=---+-=D + [10]
If gt R is I(1), 0<b<1 implies,  given [10], that Dbt is I(1), no matter whether et is
I(0) or I(1). In other words, cointegration in [6] plays no role, and consequently the
transversality condition will behave as [8], being the deficit process sustainable only in
its weak form. On the contrary, Dbt will be I(0) and thus the deficit strongly sustainable,
when simultaneously b=1 and e t are I(0), i.e. cointegration between public revenues
and expenditures holds. If we reject cointegration in [6] and b equals 1, the deficit will
be sustainable in its weak form, because according to [10], Dbt will be I(1) as well.
Finally, if b=0 the deficit is not sustainable because according to [10] Dbt would grow at
a rate greater than l, and thus the discount factor would never offset Dbt. A summary of
all the possibilities is found in table 1.
                                                
9  Quintos shows that when Dbt contains a trend the bubble term still goes to zero, although at a lower rate
than in [8], being the deficit weakly sustainable in this case.
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Table 1: Quintos’ test
Cases for gtR ~ I(1)
Values for b and Cointegration in [6] Yields Dbt Þ Conclusion for sustainability
b=1 Yes I(0) Strong sustainability
b=1 No I(1) Weak sustainability
0<b<1 Plays no role I(1) Weak sustainability
b=0 Plays no role I(1) No sustainability
According to the process described earlier, Quintos suggests first to analyse the
orders of integration of the variables gtR and tt, and provided that they are I(1), to
estimate [6] and test the null H0: b=0 against the alternative Ha: b>0. If H0 is accepted
the deficit is not sustainable, whereas if it is rejected the null H0: b=1 against Ha: b<1
should be tested. Should H0 be rejected, the result 0<b<1 is obtained and the
transversality condition would behave as [8], and accordingly the deficit would be
weakly sustainable. In this case, as [9] shows, the undiscounted debt process contains
an explosive root. On the other hand, if one cannot reject H0: b=1, one should test for a
cointegration relationship in [6]. In case cointegration is accepted, the transversality
condition will behave as [7], and therefore, the strong sustainability result will hold. If,
on the contrary, cointegration is rejected in [6], the transversality condition will behave
again as [8], and thus the deficit will be weakly sustainable.
3.2. Empirical results for the sustainability analysis
Given that tt, and gtR are I(1) processes (see appendix A), we perform Quintos'
test and estimate [6] for the whole sample. We estimated [6] by OLS, the maximum
likelihood procedure suggested by Johansen, and by the non-parametrical procedure
proposed by Phillips and Hansen (1990)10. Once [6] was estimated, we performed
several cointegration tests based on the ADF and Phillips (1987) statistics and the
Trace Statistic suggested by Johansen. The estimation and cointegration tests results
are summarised in table 2 and none of the tests reject the null of absence of
cointegration between both variables. Moreover, the estimated coefficient is between
zero and one, which, according to Quintos, would lead us to conclude that deficit is
sustainable in the weaker form11. However, such a result is not at all informative
because the absence of cointegration yields a spurious estimation of b. In order to
avoid this problem and to complete Quintos’ test, we estimated [6] in first differences
(Hamilton, 1994) by OLS, yielding an estimated coefficient of b=0.31. This coefficient
was statistically different from 0 and 1. We also estimated the equation in first
differences by instrumental variables in order to avoid estimation problems derived
from the possible endogeneity of the regressors. In this case the estimated coefficient
was b=0.27, also statistically different from 0 and 1. Given that the condition 0<b<1
holds, the transversality condition behaves as [8], and accordingly the deficit process is
sustainable in its weaker form. Furthermore, by [9] we know that the debt process
should have an explosive root, which is consistent with the positive t-ratios obtained in
                                                
10  The latter may be advisable when the regressors may be endogenous, which leads to a second order
asymptotic bias in the OLS estimators. The second-order asymptotic bias arises because the estimators
are still consistent when cointegration holds. In order to correct this bias, they suggest estimating by
instrumental variables, but the instruments do not fully eliminate the asymptotic bias when the regressors
are endogenous. Therefore, they suggest semi-parametric corrections in the long run covariance matrix,
which lead to asymptotically unbiased-in-median estimators.  These fully-modified estimators form the
basis of the so-called fully-modified Wald tests, which can be used for testing general linear hypotheses of
the coefficients in cointegrating regressions, and their asymptotic distributions are c2. The correction in the
long-run covariance matrix is based on the procedure suggested by Andrews and Monahan (1992).
11  The results derived from our estimations here are not very different from those of Camarero, Esteve
and Tamarit (1998).
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the unit-root tests on bt without considering either a constant or a deterministic trend
(see appendix A). The estimated explosive root in this case has been 1.01, and its
small magnitude can explain why the process followed by this variable can be better
approximated by a I(1) rather than by a I(2) one.
The results so far obtained are not conclusive in that the power of the ADF and
other cointegration tests diminishes in the presence of structural breaks12. Over the
course of sample period, on the other hand, many fiscal reforms have taken place in
Spain. In particular, since the late seventies, fiscal policy in Spain changed from a
system in which the general government budgets were formally balanced, or even
showed a small surplus, to another –as from 1976- with public deficits, linked to the
expansion of spending as a consequence of moving towards European welfare state
models. Also, the tax system was thoroughly overhauled, with the introduction of
personal income tax in 1978 and VAT in 1986. Further, the progressive move as from
1983 from monetisation to a more orthodox financing of the deficit, which coincides in
time with high budget imbalances, resulted in the emergence of a significant public
debt balance and a subsequent increase in the interest burden. Lastly, further to the
1978 Constitution, there has been a gradual fiscal decentralisation process, involving a
drift of responsibilities for the management of certain services form the State to the
regional governments along with the developments of the arrangements for financing
these responsibilities. Therefore, in the following section we will consider the possibility
of presence of structural breaks and explore whether the conclusions are substantially
affected.
Table 2: Long run relationship between tt and gtR
t
R
tt ugt ++=  ba
OLS (Phillips-
Ouliaris)
Phillips-Hansen Johansen Critical values
10% 5% 1%
b 0.77 0.79 0.74
ADF -2.01 -1.92 -3.51 -3.80 -4.36
Za -16.96 -17.01 -23.19 -27.08 -32.19
Zt -1.05 -1.79 -3.51 -3.80 -4.36
Trace   r=0 19.54 19.96 24.60
             r£1 4.41 9.24 12.97
Fully modified
Wald test
b=0  704.09***
b=1    51.97***
2.71 3.84 6.63
Note: Critical values for the statistics Za and Zt have been taken fron Phillips and Ouliaris (1990).
The Gregory and Hansen test
Gregory and Hansen (1996) are concerned with the possibility that the
cointegrating vector may change during the sample period at a single unknown point in
time. If this is true, the standard ADF and Phillips Za and Zt tests lose power. As a
consequence, if the true model is cointegrated with a regime shift, standard analysis
consisting of estimating [6] and performing ADF or Phillips Za and Zt tests on the
cointegrating residuals does not reject the null of no cointegration. Gregory and
Hansen propose a statistic that attempts to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration
                                                
12  See Hansen (1992), Hansen and Johansen (1992), Gregory, Nason and Watt (1996) and Gregory and
Hansen (1996).
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against the alternative of cointegration with a structural break at an unknown point in
time, and accordingly consider three possible models. Thus, they allow only for
changes in the intercept, without and with time trend, and shifts in both the intercept
and slope coefficients. These are referred to as Level shift (C), Level shift with trend
(C/T) and Regime shift (C/S) models, respectively. In this context, the stable
cointegration relationship without structural breaks is only a particular case. Their
procedure consists of estimating by OLS and computing the cointegration tests for
every possible break point and selecting as the most probable break point that
associated with the highest absolute value for these tests13 (InfADF).
Table 3: Gregory-Hansen tests for structural breaks
Model InfADF Year Mean
ADF
Zt Za Year Crit.Values
a
InfADF, Zt
Crit values
MeanADF
Crit.values
 Za
10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5%
Level
shift (C) -3.79 1990 -2.62 -3.36 -20.46 1987 -4.34 -4.61 -3.53 -3.80 -36.19 -40.48
Regime
Shift
(C/S)
-4.56 1988 -2.76 -4.21 -26.31 1987 -4.68 -4.95 -3.52 -3.78 -41.85 -47.04
Notes: The critical values have been taken from Gregory and Hansen (1996). Year columns refer to the
most probable break points according to the reported statistics.
Table 3 shows the results from the implementation of these tests to the Spanish
case. As can be seen, none of the statistics turned out to be significant. These results,
together with those in table 2, support the null hypothesis of no cointegration in [6].
However, the statistic InfADF applied to the (C/S) model shows that, albeit non-
significant, between 1987 and 1988 a change in the fiscal policy regime may have
taken place.
The Hansen test
Hansen (1992) also considers the possibility of a structural break at an
unknown point in time, although the null hypothesis is the existence of cointegration, in
contrast with the Gregory and Hansen test. Hansen provides three tests for parameter
instability based on the information derived from the fully-modified residuals in the
cointegrating equation14. The statistics of these tests are complementary to those
proposed by Gregory and Hansen, in the sense that Hansen tests the null of
cointegration with no regime shift against the alternative that a regime shift has
occurred. Following Hansen we will call these statistics SupF, MeanF and Lc. Their
values are reported in table 4. Accordingly, the Lc and the SupF statistics show
evidence of parameter stability, although the MeanF statistic could suggest that a
gradual change in the behaviour of the fiscal variables may have taken place.
Note that the null can be rejected not only because there is a regime shift, but
also because cointegration does not hold in [6]. Therefore, the Lc statistic can also be
understood as a LM cointegration test. According to its value, it suggests a stable long-
term relationship between public revenues and expenditures, in contrast with the
results derived from the standard cointegration tests and those proposed by Gregory
and Hansen.
                                                
13  See appendix B for details on the implementation of this test.
14  See appendix C for a detailed explanation of these tests.
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Table 4: Hansen test
Statistic Value P-value
Lc 0.10 0.20
MeanF 3.05 0.17
SupF 6.88 0.20
Note: P-value column shows the probability of parameter instability.
Probability equal to 0.20 means ³0.20. According to Hansen
(1992), a P-value over 0.20 can be taken as evidence of parameter
stability.
The Hansen and Johansen Test
Hansen and Johansen (1993) do not examine directly the stability of the
parameters in the cointegration equation, but the stability of the eigenvalues associated
with the Error Correction Model (ECM henceforth) that yield to the estimation of the
cointegrating vector. They propose a recursive Likelihood Ratio test with null of
cointegration for every subsample15. The statistics to be considered will be referred to
as SupHJ and MeanHJ, which are the maximum and mean of the sequence of all the
HJ(t) statistics for every possible break point. The results drawn from this test are
presented in table 5. Only the MeanHJ statistic turned out to be significant at the 10%
level which could indicate a gradual regime shift, although the evidence on parameter
instability is not conclusive at all.
Table 5: Hansen and Johansen test
Critical valuesStatisic Value
10% 5% 1%
SupHJ 3.20 3.69 4.81 7.39
Break point 1966
MeanHJ 0.78 0.69 0.98 1.65
The results from the tests above do not support the hypothesis of the existence
of a structural break in the behaviour of the fiscal variables. Rather, they could be taken
as evidence of a gradual shift, although the evidence on this latter issue is far from
conclusive. Moreover, we do not have clear evidence of cointegration. Neither the
Gregory and Hansen test nor the standard cointegration tests allow us to reject the null
of no cointegration, although the Lc test would suggest the contrary. Nevertheless,
according to Gregory and Hansen (1996), it would be advisable to test first the null of
no cointegration and, if it is rejected in favour of the (C) or the (C/S) models, then
perform the Hansen test in order to obtain deeper evidence of a regime shift.
So far, our results do not qualitatively differ from those obtained by Camarero et
al. (1998). However, given the above results we consider that a deeper univariate
analysis of the series involved is of great interest when addressing the problem of
sustainability, and may provide us with useful information in order to derive our
conclusions. If we consider that in a given period the order of integration of the series
                                                
15  More detailed information on this test can be found in appendix D. Programs have been provided by
J.L. Fernández.
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involved in the analysis has changed, then the latter analysis is misleading. In this
context, changes in the order of integration can be associated with fiscal reforms or
even with the achievement of a given level, after a gradual adjustment, in the variables
considered after the implementation of the above-mentioned reforms. This is our
justification for considering an alternative way of addressing the problem of fiscal
sustainability.
Tests of changes in the order of integration
If the order of integration varies over time the implications for a sustainability
analysis may be very important, because it can make us change our initial view derived
from the estimation of [6] with or without structural breaks. Concretely, if Dbt is not
stationary in the first part of the sample but becomes stationary in the last part,
although a global analysis would lead us to conclude that, according to [9], the deficit
process is sustainable in a weak sense, the relevant issue for analysing the future
behaviour will be the current process followed by this variable. As a result, we should
say that the sustainability seems to be turning to its strong form and no future fiscal
problems seem to arise in the horizon.
Earlier work on this issue has been done by Leybourne, McCabe and Tremayne
(1996) and Maeso (1997). Here, we follow Fernández (1999) and use a sequential
procedure  in order to get the following statistics: Suptd1, Meantd1, Suptd2, Meantd2,
Supta1, Meanta1, Supta2 and Meanta2. As before, the Sup statistics have power for a
unique break point, whereas the mean ones have power for gradual changes.
According to Zivot and Andrews (1992), the break point is associated with the
observation that corresponds to the Sup16.
The results derived from these tests are shown in table 6. The general
conclusion that can be extracted is that the Mean statistics for the last part of the
sample tend to reject the null of I(1) at the 10% significance level, whereas the null is
not rejected for the first part. This indicates that the processes followed by the relevant
variables are becoming stationary, and accordingly the debt in GDP percentage points
is becoming I(1). The change is taking place in a gradual form and begins between the
late 80s and the early 90s. This result has a direct economic interpretation since the
first sample period, which covers from 1964 to the early 90s, was characterised by the
implementation of a modern fiscal policy in Spain, which implied the building of the
Welfare State and a new tax system, moving towards European models, that required
a rapid expansion of public revenues and expenditures.  Once this target was achieved
and with the additional constraint derived from the commitment to meet the
convergence criteria set out in the Treaty on European Union, consolidation issues
become more relevant in conducting fiscal policy.
Therefore, the general conclusions drawn from the estimation of [6] and the
structural-break tests on the cointegrating relationship must be questioned because the
variables in [6] are not always I(1), and, consequently, the cointegrating analysis may
lose sense at least for the whole sample period. Furthermore, our results show that in
recent years the “sustainability in the weak sense” seems to be changing into
“sustainability in a strong sense”, according to Quintos’ terminology, and no future
problems in marketing public debt are expected to arise as far as this trend is
confirmed.
                                                
16  See appendix E for technicalities.
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Table 6: Partial integration tests17
Critical values18
Statistic Dbt tt gt
R dt 10% 5% 1%
Suptd  1 -2.35 -0.59 -1.26 -1.89 -3.44 -3.76 -4.44
Year 1993 1974 1988 1976
Meantd  1 -0.97 0.98 0.25 -1.21 -2.37 -2.46 -3.23
Suptd  2 -3.89* -3.38 -3.59 -3.33 -3.80 -4.12 -4.76
Year 1987 1991 1988 1980
Meantd  2 -2.96** -2.42* -2.44* -2.40* -2.36 -2.59 -3.07
Supta  1 -2.35 -0.68 -1.23 -1.67 -3.18 -3.48 -4.12
Year 1968 1970 1968 1990
Meanta  1 -0.73 0.62 0.07 -0.68 -2.09 -2.35 -2.88
Supta  2 -3.71* -3.55 -3.37 -3.22 -3.60 -3.91 -4.52
Year 1987 1991 1988 1980
Meanta  2 -2.80*** -2.09* -2.23* -2.11* -2.09 -2.28 -2.65
Note: (*), (**) and (***) mean rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
However, any conclusion to be derived from these results should take into
account the limitations of the analysis, in particular the fact that this is based on past
data. Therefore, under this approach, the sustainability of the Spanish fiscal policy
should be interpreted in the sense that no problems in marketing public debt are
expected to arise if the variables involved follow the pattern of the past in the future.
4. CAUSALITY ANALYSIS
Given the limitations of the sustainability analysis already mentioned, the fact
that the change from weak sustainability to strong sustainability is not fully confirmed
for a large sample period and that, even if this is the case, the Stability and Growth
Pact for the EMU countries sets explicit ceilings to public finance that might require
additional consolidation efforts in Spain, we consider the issue of which is the most
efficient strategy to achieve permanent reductions in fiscal deficits. Thus, we analyse
the possible interdependence between government expenditure and revenues and the
issue of whether higher taxed lead to expenditure changes or whether expenditure
growth leads budget dynamics, with taxes following suit.
4.1. Main theoretical hypotheses
The effect of an unanticipated change in public spending or revenue on the size
of the budget and the budget deficit depends in a complex way on the characteristics of
the tax system and the way in which the political system articulates spending demands
and redistribution objectives. Economic theory on the relationship between public
spending and revenue offers explanations for all possible directions of causality
between public spending and revenue.
Independence of public spending and revenue is consistent with the Ricardian
equivalence theorem (Barro, 1974). Given an exogenously determined time path for
public spending, there exist an infinite number of distributions of the tax burden over
time that satisfy the government's intertemporal budget constraint (GIBC). By
postulating exogenous government behaviour with respect to spending decisions,
current tax changes merely entail future changes in revenue with the same present
                                                
17  The programs for performing these tests have also been provided by J. L. Fernández.
18  Taken from Fernandez (1999).
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value and the opposite sign. Moreover, an increase in public spending today may be
financed by changes in current taxes or by debt (future tax changes). Accordingly, we
should not expect to find a stable and significant contemporaneous relationship
between public spending and revenue. In a Ricardian economy, any plan to control the
deficit is, a priori, equally effective as long as it is consistent with the GIBC.
If some endogeneity is admitted in the behaviour of government, the fulfilment
of the GIBC gives support to the hypothesis that spending determines revenue.
Applying conventional results of optimal tax theory, Barro's "tax smoothing" theory
(1979) predicts that an unanticipated increase in the public spending/output ratio will be
followed by a rise in the public revenue/output ratio, that will be achieved by choosing a
constant rate of tax19 that minimises the cost of raising revenue over time, by the
amount necessary to balance the GIBC.
In its basic version, the "tax smoothing" hypothesis predicts that higher
spending generates higher taxes (and a larger temporary deficit). This pattern of
behaviour is also characteristic of other traditional explanations of public economics.
Peacock and Wiseman (1979) argue that increases in spending associated with
situations of social crisis or war can force a change in attitude on the part of citizens
with respect to the "tolerable" tax burden, which gradually rises (shift effect). Following
the crisis, part of the initial shift is consolidated as permanent, with the emergence of
new spending demands (inspection effect). There are also other more general
explanations associated with the institutional features of the budgetary process.
Revenue and spending programmes involve different time horizons. If consumers are
partly non-Ricardian and politicians discount the future, the political pressures for
higher public spending - exerted during the stages of preparation (interest groups),
approval (lobbying) and implementation (bureaucracy) of the budget - will tend to
dominate budget dynamics. The resulting increase in taxes (the deficit) will be all the
smaller (larger) the more lax are the budget rules (von Hagen, 1992) and the more
fragmented is political power (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). When the direction of
causality goes from spending to revenue, as it does under this behavioural hypothesis,
control of the deficit can be achieved through unanticipated increases in the tax burden
or strict (legal) limits on the level of public spending.
There are two different public finance traditions, both with great political
prestige, according to which, over time, taxes determine spending. First we have the
"government leviathan" hypothesis (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980): unless
constitutional limits are imposed on the expansion of government, in post-constitutional
periods the latter will attempt to maximise the revenue from any source of tax that is
constitutionally within its reach. This rule of behaviour enables a minimum level of
specific goods and services demanded by citizens to be financed, while maximising the
amount of resources that the government can use at its own discretion. The "tax and
spend" hypothesis, which can count Friedman (1978) and Gramlich (1989) among its
proponents20, predicts that as technological advances increase the capacity to raise
revenue and as economic activity becomes increasingly focussed on the market, the
tax burden will increase and, consequently, so will government spending21.
                                                
19  The constancy of the tax burden is not a general result. Barro (1979) obtains it by assuming that the
function of revenue-raising costs is homogeneous to the first degree in total taxes and output. Aschauer
and Greenwood (1985) derive the same result postulating intertemporally separable preferences for
consumption and leisure. Without restrictions on preferences the tax rate must change over time.
20  This view of government is characteristic of European and North-American political liberalism. In the
US, with its well-known terminological peculiarity, the economic programmes of the Republican Party
regularly define their position on fiscal and budgetary policy as being the antithesis of that of the "tax and
spend liberals" of the Democratic Party.
21  Ward (1982) and Kau and Rubin (1981) have found empirical support for this prediction.
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In this scenario, increases in the tax burden will only reduce the budget deficit in
the short term, but may increase it in future if there are no restrictions on the issuance
of public debt. The control of the deficit should be based on the establishment of legal
restrictions on the deficit or on borrowing, combined with discretionary cuts in
spending. However, in accordance with a second behavioural hypothesis, the
restrictive effect of taxes may be partly offset by the presence of fiscal illusion. If
taxpayers believe that the "price" of public services coincides with the taxes currently
paid, increases in the budget deficit will prompt greater spending demands (Buchanan
and Wagner, 1977). An increase in the tax burden will be perceived in this case as an
increase in the cost of public benefits, which will reduce the social demands for public
spending.
Interdependence of spending and taxes is the fourth possibility. When political
decisions on spending and taxes are taken and endured by the same group, they will
be joint and interdependent. This description of the budgetary process originates in
Wicksell (1896) and has been reformulated by Musgrave (1966) and Meltzer and
Richard (1981). The result of interdependence is also consistent with "tax smoothing"
theory: when the political process which decides the path of spending takes into
account the marginal cost of raising and administering taxes, spending and taxes will
be determined together (Blanchard and Fisher, 1989). When public spending and
revenue are interdependent budget discipline requires action to be taken on both sides
of the budget simultaneously.
The empirical literature on dynamic interdependence of public spending and
revenue, mostly referring to the US economy, offers a great variety of results. Shibata
and Kimura (1986) cannot reject the null hypothesis of absence of causality between
spending and revenue. Von Furstemburg et al. (1986) find decisive evidence of
causality, although the "spending causes taxes" direction seems dominant. In
Anderson et al. (1986) spending causes, in the Granger sense, taxes. Causality in the
opposite direction is the main result of Blackley (1986). Ram (1988a) distinguishes
between the federal and state levels of government, identifying two opposite patterns of
behaviour: spending causes taxes at the state level, while the opposite is the case at
the federal level. Owoke (1995), Miller and Russek (1990) and Manage and Marlow
(1986) identify a pattern of causality in both directions. Finally, in a recent work, Payne
(1998) examines the relationship between revenues and expenditures for USA and
finds that the argument that tax cause expending is supported for 24 states, while the
opposite conclusion is supported for 8 estates and a bidirectional causality is valid for
11 estates.
The evidence available for other countries is also mixed. Ram (1988b) finds an
absence of causality most of the time. Joulfaian and Mookerjee (1991) analyse the
interdependence of spending and taxes in 22 OECD countries, using first differences of
autoregressive vectors (VAR). In 11 cases no causal relationship is detected, in 8
spending causes taxes, in 2 the "tax and spend" hypothesis is confirmed, and in 1
causality is in both directions. In the case of Spain, this study indicates that spending
causes revenue when this pair of variables is considered alone. However, when the
cyclical position of the economy and inflation are controlled for, the result is
independence. Raymond and González-Páramo (1988) find weak evidence of
causality, in the Granger sense, running from taxes to the level of public spending,
whereas González-Páramo (1994) finds strong support to the tax and spend
hypothesis for the sample period 1955-1991. Finally, Belessiotis (1995) examines this
issue for the European Community Member States and finds that there is
interdependence between fiscal variables for 12 countries, while only in the case of UK,
the data suggests independence. In 2 cases, this study finds that government
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expenditure causes revenues; in 5 cases, causality is found from revenues to
expenditure and, in 6 cases (including Spain), bi-directional causality is found.
4.2. Preliminary causality results
The most generalized hypothesis about the behaviour of the Spanish public
sector assigns a prominent role to public expenditure. The oil crises, the change of the
political system in the mid seventies and the implementation of the Welfare System
have conditioned the evolution of this variable, followed with a certain delay by tax
reforms and changes in the fiscal pressure. This hypothesis seems to be supported by
the pattern followed by spending and revenues in figure 1 above. In order to provide
some empirical support to this statement we look at Granger causality tests (see
Granger, 1969), which is based in the notion that lagged realizations of one variable x
help to predict current values of another w. More precisely, x G-causes w if the forecast
error variance of w is significantly lower when lagged realizations of x are in the
information set than when they are not. Therefore, departing from the model
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where et is white noise, the null hypothesis that x does not G-cause w can be
contrasted with usual tests of the joint restriction m1=…=mk=0. In principle, these tests
are appropriate when the variables involved are stationary and the process is not
misspecified. Omission of relevant variables may lead to incorrectly detect directions of
causality or even discover causality when it does not really exists, yielding to spurious
results (Granger and Newbold, 1986). Hence, if a shock in variable u generates a
reduction in x in period t and a further reduction in w in period t+1, the exclusion of u in
the information set could produce the spurious result that x causes w.
Theories of behaviour of expenditure and revenues point to GDP and prices as
relevant variables to include in such an analysis. The “Wagner’s Law” associates the
level of the public expenditure to the degree of economic development, which can be
approximated by real income. Moreover, Musgrave relates the tax collecting capacity
with technological development and the degree of monetisation of transactions, factors
that are also positively correlated with real income22. Furthermore, revenues and
expenditures respond automatically to the cycle as automatic stabilizers. On the other
hand, Baumol states that the relative cost of the public output is increasing in time due
to the productivity differential between private and public sector. If this differential is
stable, increases in prices could help to explain increases in public expenditure. Finally,
taxes and spending also respond to the inflation rate, due to the existence of indexation
clauses in many spending programs or the real increase in tax collections for the
absence of automatic indexation of tables in personal taxes. This phenomenon is
known as fiscal drag.
In order to perform a preliminary causality analysis we differenced the variables
in order to achieve stationarity (see table A.1 in appendix A) and we considered several
possibilities as to the inclusion of the GDP growth rate and the inflation rate. The
results are shown in table 7 and offer very weak evidence that, if any, revenues G-
cause expenditures. This evidence only appears when using two lags in the analysis
and D2yt and D2pt are included in the regressions. On the contrary, the null that
                                                
22 A brief survey of theories explaining public expenditure growth can be found in González-Páramo and
Raymond (1988). As regards to the evolution of public revenues, the classical reference is Musgrave
(1969).
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expenditures G-cause revenues finds no empirical support so far. This finding
contradicts the generally accepted explanation for the behaviour of the public sector
stated above. However, these results may be biased in that we have not consider so
far the possibility of the existence of long-run relationships among the variables
involved. We will see in next section that taking into account this possibility changes
the conclusions sharply and help to discover relevant directions of causality that
constitute the basis of the conclusions of this paper.
Table 7. Granger causality tests
Without D2yt, D2pt With D2yt, D2ptNull hypothesis
k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2
tt does not G-cause gtR 0.72 1.95 0.38 5.33*
gtR does not G-cause tt 0.73 0.27 1.05 0.52
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%
and 1% significance levels, respectively.
4.3. Long run analysis and causality
Cointegration analysis
The analysis of the existence of cointegration between revenues and
expenditures is important for two reasons: First, because the cointegration
relationships must be included in causality tests. The Granger-causality analysis
performed in last section can be misleading if it contains a specification error. If the
variables involved are linked in the long term by cointegration relationships the
estimated cointegrating vectors should be included in the specification of the VAR used
to test Granger-causality (Granger, 1988). Thus, the inclusion of the so called
“equilibrium residuals” may modify the sense of the causality on the one hand, and may
give us useful information by distinguishing between long term and short term
causality. Second, because the estimated parameters may indicate the existence of a
possible long-term relationship between deficit and public sector’s size. Thus, a
coefficient affecting revenues in the cointegrating vectors equal to –1 implies that deficit
is independent of fiscal pressure or the size of the public sector. Therefore, a long-
lasting reduction of deficit would require altering its generating process by reducing its
structural component or by altering the elasticity to the cycle or inflation. On the other
hand, if this coefficient is greater than one in absolute value, fiscal consolidation could
be achieved with a reduction in the public sector’s size. Without altering the generating
process, that is, without structural breaks, consolidation should be leaned on
expenditures, revenues, or both, depending on the causality structure.
In table 8 we present the estimation of several models in order to test whether
there is cointegration23 among the relevant variables. These models have been
                                                
23  Previous to these results we estimated three models by OLS in which the dependent variable was
public expenditure and the regressors were public revenues, growth rate of real output and the inflation
rate; public revenues and growth rate of real output and public revenues only. These estimations gave
coefficients for the public revenues between 1.23 and 1.27. The ADF test performed on the residuals from
the three specifications could, in none of the cases, reject the null hypothesis of absence of cointegration.
However, due to the well-known problem of common factor restrictions implied in this way of testing
cointegration we considered convenient to proceed in a different way. Nevertheless, the coefficients for the
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estimated using the maximum likelihood procedure suggested by Johansen (1988),
Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1991). The critical values have been
taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). LR tests were performed in order to contrast
several hypothesis that could give us clues to discern about different specifications.
Model [11] is estimated with an unrestricted constant, which implies that the
model includes a linear deterministic trend in levels. Although this assumption can be
controversial, given that we are using public revenues and expenditures as
percentages of GDP and it is not expected that in the long run this trend will be
present, it fits very well with the sample period we have. Thus, the specification of the
model is
),,,(  ;  )1,('
2
1
10 ttt
R
ttt
i
ititt pytgXXXX DD=+DG++=D å
=
-- eabm [11]
We find two cointegrating vectors according to the Trace and LRmax statistics.
The null hypothesis of weak exogeneity of the variables is rejected except for the case
of Dpt (c22=3.15), although the joint hypothesis of weak exogeneity and long run
exclusion of this variable is rejected at the 1% significance level (c42=21.67). It is worth
to notice that the public revenues’ coefficients in the cointegrating vectors are always
greater than one in absolute value. The null hypothesis of this coefficient equal to –1 is
rejected, according to the LR test that appears in the table, at the 1% significance level.
Given the weak exogeneity of Dpt the model was re-specified including D2pt in
the VAR. This corresponds to model [12].
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According to the Trace statistic we find three cointegrating vectors. In all of
them the coefficient affecting revenues is greater than one, and in the two first vectors
the value of this coefficient is almost equal than in model [11], so the change of the
dynamic structure does not affect the long run relationship among the variables
significantly. The null of the revenues’ coefficient equal to –1 is also rejected at the 1%
significance level. In this second model we cannot reject the null that gtR is weakly
exogenous (c42=7.16), although the value of this test is very close to significance. For
the rest of the variables the null of weak exogeneity is rejected. Furthermore, the long
run exclusion of Dpt was also rejected at the 1% significance level (c32=14.23).
Therefore, we decided not to re-specify the model again.
As stated above, the inclusion of a linear deterministic trend in the data may be
a controversial hypothesis from the economic point of view when using variables as
percentages of GDP. Accordingly, we tried a similar specification to model [11] but with
the constant restricted. This is what we call model [13], and the whole specification is
),,,(    ;  )1,('
2
1
1 ttt
R
ttt
i
ititt pytgXXXX DD=+DG+=D å
=
-- eab [13]
In all cases but for Dpt (c22=2.72) the null of weak exogeneity was clearly
rejected. The joint hypothesis of weak exogeneity and long run exclusion of this
                                                                                                                                              
public revenues can be informative about the long run relationship between expenditures and revenues.
This coefficient seems in all cases to be greater than one.
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variable is rejected at the 1% significance level (c42=17.82). In this model the coefficient
affecting revenues was, as in the other cases, greater than one. As the table shows,
the hypothesis that this coefficient equals –1 is also rejected at the 1% significance
level. For all the models above, tests of lags reduction were performed and were
significant in all cases24.
According to our results, a bias towards deficit seems to exist in the public
sector’s size. This bias arises because the coefficient for tt in the cointegrating vectors
is greater than one in absolute value. This implies, as stated before, that fiscal
consolidation could be achieved with a reduction in the public sector size. As regards
the most adequate strategy of fiscal consolidation to be selected to reach this target,
the analysis of the direction of causality between the fiscal variables can offer a
relevant guideline.
Table 8. Cointegration results (Johansen tests)
Cointegrating vectors
H0(r) LRmax Trace g
R  t Dy Dp Intercept
Model [11] r=0 24.90* 55.87*** 1 -1.20 0.46 0.39
r£1 22.78** 30.97** 1 -1.52 -1.00 -0.45
r£2 5.48 8.19
r£3 2.71* 2.71* c22=17.01***
Model [12] r=0 22.27** 38.26*** 1 -1.50 -0.72 -0.26
r£1 11.69 15.99** 1 -1.21 0.39 0.26
r£2 4.30** 4.30** 1 -1.05 1.06 -0.02
c32=18.67***
Model [13] r=0 28.75** 66.69*** 1 -1.11 0.87 0.55 -0.05
r£1 22.99** 37.39** 1 -1.45 -0.65 -0.24 0.16
r£2 10.66 14.95
r£3 4.29 4.29 c22=12.51***
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
Causality analysis with cointegrated variables
As regards to the estimations in table 8, we performed Granger-causality tests
including the cointegrating vectors. Weakly exogenous variables such as Dpt in models
[11] and [13] were included as D2pt in the VAR. The high degree of correlation between
the residuals from the expenditures’ and revenues’ equations leaded us to estimate
these equations by both OLS and SURE, which is a more efficient method than OLS.
Nevertheless, both procedures yield similar results. In this context, short-term causality
is understood as a situation in which lagged changes in one variable have predictive
power in current changes in another one, whereas long-term causality is detected
when the lagged level of one variable (equilibrium residuals) explains current changes
in another variable. These chi-squared tests are shown in table 9 and have been
performed with one and two lags (the number of lags is k).
According to table 9 results, we observe a long-run direction of causality from
public expenditures to revenues, which is more evident when we introduce two lags in
the equations. On the other hand, the inclusion of the cointegrating vectors from
models [11] and [12] also show evidence of long-run causality from revenues to
                                                
24 F(16,46)=2.02**, F(9,41)=2.16** and F(16,46)=2.02** for models [1], [2] and [3], respectively.
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expenditures, which is stronger with one, rather than two, lags. Lastly, revenues-to-
expenditure long-run causality is not detected in model [13] with two lags, whereas with
one lag this causality seems to be present. However, the estimated models of
cointegration seemed to support the inclusion of the two lags (see footnote 17).
Contrary to the long-run case, short-run causality seems to hold only in the
expenditures-to-revenues direction when we specify the model with two lags, and this
evidence is only significant at the 10% significance level.
 
Table 9. Granger causality tests with cointegrated variables
OLS estimates SURE estimates
Null hypothesis  k=1 k=2  k=1 k=2
Short
 run
Long run Short
run
Long
run
Short
run
Long
run
Short
run
Long
run
tt does not G-cause gtR
[11] 0.02 7.34** 2.37 5.17* 0.03 9.40*** 3.50 7.63**
[12] 0.00 9.18** 2.57 7.16* 0.00 9.51** 2.59 7.47*
[13] 0.35 6.09** 1.87 3.51 0.35 6.18** 1.88 3.55
gtR does not G-cause tt
[11] 0.40 5.04* 5.16* 9.41*** 0.17 6.46** 7.62** 13.90***
[12] 0.04 6.73* 4.75* 11.76*** 0.04 6.80* 4.79* 12.15***
[13] 0.04 15.34*** 4.83* 17.48*** 0.04 15.93*** 4.86* 18.15***
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
In sum, our tests seem to show clear evidence of public expenditures G-causing
public revenues in the long run and also, although less clear, evidence of long-run G-
causality from revenues to public expenditure. In other words, we obtain evidence of
long-run bidirectional causality. Furthermore, in the short run the direction of causality
seems to hold only from expenditures to public revenues. These results, together with
the bias to deficit in the size of the public sector that arises from coefficients affecting
revenues greater than one in absolute value in the cointegrating vectors, tend to
support the idea that efficient fiscal consolidation could be attained by paying special
attention to public expenditures. This variable seems to play a crucial role, at least in a
first step, given its importance in explaining the process followed by tax collections.
Variance decomposition: VAR in levels
Another tentative way of characterising the interdependence between the most
relevant variables in our analysis, public expenditures and revenues, is by means of
the variance decomposition and impulse response functions in a context of a VAR
analysis. Variance decomposition functions indicate which part of the variance of the
forecast error in one variable can be attributed to innovations in another after some
periods. Accordingly, this decomposition can be used to approximate the contribution
of every variable to variability of the whole system. If the errors in a VAR system are
contemporaneously correlated (in our case the correlation is about 0.56), it is not
possible to attribute the shocks to a single variable, making it necessary to identify the
model. We shall use a simple recursive system based on the Cholesky decomposition.
When this identification scheme is used, the order of the equations in the VAR is not a
trivial issue, and the impulse response functions and variance decomposition may
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show different results depending on the order. Thus, we offer the estimations with the
order (gR,t), which means that the common component in the error term is totally
attributed to the expenditures, whereas a shock to revenues only affect this variable
contemporaneously, and the order (t,gR), which does the opposite. In order to check
whether our conclusions are modified by the introduction of the GDP growth rate, we
also present the same results for the three-variable VAR25 with the identification
schemes (Dy,gR,t) and (Dy,t,gR).
It is convenient to point out that the Cholesky decomposition used to identify the
VAR is not the most convenient one, mostly when the causality analysis shows that
revenues and spending show bidirectional causality. Thus, other identification schemes
would be more accurate. However, our purpose in this section is not analizing in depth
the effects of fiscal shocks. Rather, we are only interested in showing that, even with
such an extreme simplification, none of both variables behave independently from each
other.
According to table 10, the variance of public expenditure in the long term is
explained in a non-negligible share by revenues, although this percentage depends on
the identification scheme. The percentage in which public expenditure explains the
variance of revenues is very sensitive to the order of the variables in the two-variable
VAR. With the order (gR,t), 55.98% of the variance of the forecast error of revenues is
explained by expenditure, whereas this percentage falls down to 7.32% when we use
the reverse order. The three-variable VAR leads to similar conclusions, in that
expenditures’ forecast error variance is explained by revenues in percentages between
30.02% and 48.27%, depending on the order. The percentage explained by the growth
rate raises up to 40.87%. In the case of revenues, the variance is explained in a
29.36% by the GDP growth rate, whereas the percentage explained by expenditures
goes from 24.05% to 1.60%, depending, as above, on the order. Consequently, we do
not get evidence of any of both, revenues and spending, behaving independently from
the other.
Table 10: Variance decomposition of the forecast error
Percentage of the forecast error in: Periods Explained by shocks in:
Order gR, t Order t, gR
gR t gR t
 gR 5 90.11 9.89 43.00 56.00
10 80.21 19.79 31.91 68.09
15 76.00 24.00 27.24 72.76
t 5 50.24 49.76 5.37 94.63
10 54.80 45.20 6.96 93.04
15 55.98 44.02 7.32 92.68
Order Dy, gR, t Order Dy, t, gR
gR t Dy gR t Dy
 gR 5 37.77 12.80 49.43 19.22 31.35 49.43
10 30.12 26.24 43.64 13.01 43.35 43.64
15 29.11 30.02 40.87 10.86 48.27 40.87
 t 5 25.89 49.22 24.89 2.10 73.01 24.89
10 24.61 46.54 28.85 1.80 69.35 28.85
15 24.05 46.59 29.36 1.60 69.04 29.36
Dy 5 3.14 8.85 88.01 8.19 3.80 88.01
10 3.98 9.70 86.32 9.62 4.06 86.32
15 4.45 9.75 85.80 9.75 4.45 85.80
                                                
25 The inflation rate has not been included in the analysis because it is weakly exogenous with respect to
the rest of the variables in the analysis, as stated in the estimation of models [11] to [13] above. Current
realizations of this variable turned out to be non-significant, so they were excluded form the VAR.
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Impulse response functions: VAR in levels
Figures 3 and 4 show impulse response functions of public deficit to innovations
in revenues and expenditures. Both specifications of the VAR yield very similar results.
A large degree of persistence in the shocks is clearly observed in all cases. A negative
shock in gtR yields to a long lasting surplus that only disappears after eight years or
even more when we include only two variables in the VAR. Including the GDP growth
rate in the VAR modifies a little the picture (Figure 4), in that a negative shock to
spending yields to a large initial increase in surplus that after five years is totally offset,
turning to deficit, when the common component is attributed to revenues in the
identification scheme. This deficit is of very small magnitude and non-significant, and
also tends to disappear.
However, an asymmetric response is found when a positive shock is simulated
on tt. A large initial reduction of deficit is observed, that after two or three periods
reverts to a deterioration of the public budget, as a consequence of the induced
response of spending. Therefore, a positive shock in tt in the long term yields to
responses of greater magnitude in gtR than in tt. This result is consistent with our
estimates of the revenues’ coefficient in the cointegrating vectors greater than one in
absolute value, which can be interpreted as a bias towards deficit of the public sector’s
size. Moreover, the response of spending that we observe after a shock in revenues in
the long term is supported by the long-run causality observed from tt to gtR.
Consequently, any deficit reduction strategies based on tax increases are only effective
in the short term, and will have adverse effects in the long term.
Figure 3. Impulse response function for public deficit. VAR with two varibles
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Thus, credible consolidation programs must be based on spending cuts in a first
stage, which are efficient both in the short and the long term. The subsequent
improvement in deficit realizations should, in a second stage, be supported by tax cuts
that would help to maintain the consolidation strategy in the long term by the reduction
of the public sector’s size. This result provides additional support to the conclusions
drawn from the causality with cointegrated variables and from the cointegration
analysis itself.
4.4. Restricted sample analysis
According to the results presented in section 3, fiscal sustainability in the “weak
sense” seems to be changing into sustainability in the “strong sense” in recent years.
Our purpose is now to analyse whether this result is related to changes in the dynamic
relationship between revenues and expenditures. More concretely, we check whether
the direction of causality obtained above is conditioned to some extent to the more
recent realisations of the variables of interest. In order to provide some insights on this
issue, we restricted the sample period to finish in 1993, since this year represents the
break point for public expenditure in Spain. Accordingly, model [12] was re-estimated
yielding the results presented in table 11.
Table 11. Cointegration results (Johansen tests). Variables as % of GDP
Cointegrating vectorsSample
1964-1993 H0(r) LRmax Trace g
R  t Dy Dp Intercept
Model [12] r=0 45.97*** 71.90*** 1 -1.17 1.65 0.17
r£1 18.39** 25.94*** 1 -1.64 -1.06 -0.37
1 -1.15 0.29 0.17r£2 7.55*** 7.55***
c22=22.74***
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
Figure 4. Impulse response function for public deficit. VAR with three varibles
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Table 12. Granger causality tests with cointegrated variables (Sample 1964-1993)
OLS estimates SURE estimates
Null hypothesis  k=1 k=2  k=1 k=2
Short
 run
Long
run
Short
run
Long
run
Short
run
Long
run
Short
run
Long
run
tt does not G-cause gtR 5.53** 14.76*** 29.38*** 41.36*** 5.74** 17.06*** 34.03*** 48.56***
gtR does not G-cause tt 0.01 6.44* 2.76 17.05*** 0.01 6.48* 2.76 17.09***
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
As in table 8, we find three cointegrating vectors. All the coefficients affecting
revenues in the cointegration vector are above 1 in absolute value (the null that these
coefficients are –1 is rejected at the 1% significance level), providing additional support
to the hypothesis that there is a bias towards deficit in the public sector’s size. The null
of weak exogeneity is rejected in all cases at the 1% significance level as well.
When we include the cointegration vectors in the Granger-causality analysis we
also obtain the interdependence result between revenues and expenditures in the long
term. However, the short causality tests yield an interesting result. Contrary to our
analysis for the whole sample period (table 9), revenues G-cause spending (table 12),
confirming previous empirical evidence (González-Páramo, 1994) and supporting the
hypothesis that in the last years there has been a change in the dynamic relationship
between both variables, as result of the fiscal consolidation strategy implemented,
based mainly on a drop in spending (see section 2). Additionally, this fiscal strategy
may have contributed to change the direction of causality between revenues and
spending and might be behind the change towards strong sustainability26.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we address two issues, the sustainability of public finances and
the interdependence between public revenues and expenditures, for the case of Spain.
First, we attempt to ascertain whether the current fiscal policy in Spain is sustainable or
not, in the sense of the current market value of debt being equal to the discounted sum
of expected future surpluses. For this purpose, we apply the traditional tests of
sustainability, following Quintos´ approach. In addition, we introduce a deeper
univariate analysis of the series. Our findings can be summarised as follows.
As regards the unit root tests applied to the variables used in the analysis, the
null hypothesis of the existence of one unit root is accepted, while all the tests reject
the null of the existence of two unit roots. Only in the case of the public debt, do the
tests not offer conclusive results about the existence of one or two unit roots in the
process followed by this variable. Furthermore, cointegration test results show the
absence of cointegration between public revenues and expenditures, and given that
the condition 0<b<1 holds, the interpretation has to be that the deficit process is
sustainable in its weak form. Moreover, the results from the tests do not support the
                                                
26 The results drawn from the variance decomposition and impulse response functions (not presented
here) yield similar conclusions to those obtained for the whole sample.
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hypothesis of the existence of a structural break in the long-term relationship between
public revenues and expenditures.
The weak sustainability result would imply that, although the transversality
condition holds, the government could eventually have problems in marketing its debt,
and this involves a risk of rising interest rates in the future. On the hand, that would
increase the primary deficit via interest payments. And, on the other, the prospects of
future increases in interest rates would cause a slowdown in economic growth and in
the government’s capacity to generate resources. This second channel also tends to
increase future deficits and could ensue in a non-sustainable path, necessitating a
fiscal adjustment.
As regards the tests applied to find changes in the order of integration of the
series, these indicate that the processes followed by revenues, expenditures and deficit
are becoming stationary, and the debt as percentage of GDP is thus turning from I(2) to
I(1), making the transversality condition hold in its strong sense, in contrast with the
results obtained by Camerero et al. (1998). This change is taking place gradually and
starts between the late 80s and early 90s. Therefore, the general conclusion drawn
from the cointegration estimation and the structural-break tests on the cointegrating
relationship must be questioned because the variables are not first-order integrated for
the whole sample period, and the cointegrating analysis may, therefore, be somewhat
lacking in meaning for this whole period.
Consequently, our results show that in recent years the “sustainability in the
weak sense” seems to be changing into “sustainability in a strong sense”, according to
Quintos’ terminology. This result seems consistent with the evolution of fiscal policy
during recent years, characterised by a gradual decline in the deficit as a result of a
drop in spending and a slight decline of total revenue over GDP that reversed the
previous tendency to imbalance in public finances.
However, any conclusion to be derived from these results should bear in mind
the limitations of the analysis, in particular the fact that this is based on past data and,
consequently, the future evolution of some structural factors (for example, demographic
trends) and their impact on public finances are not taken into account. Therefore, under
this approach, the sustainability of the Spanish fiscal policy should be interpreted in the
sense that no problems in marketing public debt are expected to arise if the variables
involved follow the pattern of the past in the future. Moreover, the well-known lack of
power of unit-root tests added to the problem of the small number of observations of
the series used in our analysis obliges us to treat the results with the greatest care.
Given the limitations of the sustainability analysis already mentioned, the fact
that the change from weak sustainability to strong sustainability is not fully confirmed
for a large sample period and that, even if this is the case, the Stability and Growth
Pact for the EMU countries sets explicit ceilings to public finance that might require
additional consolidation efforts in Spain, we consider the issue of which is the most
efficient strategy to achieve permanent reductions in fiscal deficits. Our results are
based on causality analysis, variance decomposition and impulse response functions.
Preliminary Granger causality tests, which are based in the notion that lagged
realisations of one variable help to predict current values of another variable, offer two
main results. First, the deficit is not independent of fiscal pressure or the size of the
public sector. Second, we find only very weak evidence, if any, that revenues G-cause
expenditures. However, these results may be biased in that they do not consider the
possibility of the existence of long-run relationships among the variables involved.
Once we consider this possibility and develop the causality analysis with cointegrated
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variables, we find clear evidence of public expenditures G-causing public revenues in
the long run and also, although less clear, evidence of long-run G-causality from
revenues to public expenditure. In other words, we obtain evidence of long-run bi-
directional causality. Furthermore, in the short run the direction of causality seems to
hold only from expenditures to public revenues in the whole sample. These findings for
the whole sample period contrast to the conclusions obtained by Joulfaian and
Mookerjee (1991), González-Páramo and Raymond (1988) and González-Páramo
(1994) for Spain, and provide support to the interdependence hypothesis.
The existence of a bias towards deficit in public sector’s size indicates that fiscal
consolidation could be achieved with a reduction in the size of the public sector. As
regards the most adequate strategy to reach this target, the evidence that public
expenditure causes revenues in the short and long term, whereas revenues only G-
cause expenditures in the long term, implies that a credible and effective fiscal
adjustment will require structural public expenditure cuts.
The variance decomposition and impulse response functions analysis in a
context of a VAR analysis confirm the latter picture. On the one hand, we get that there
is a non-negligible dynamic relationship of dependence between revenues and
expenditure. On the other, the results of the impulse response functions confirm the
result of the existence of a bias towards deficit in public sector’s size and support the
idea that efficient fiscal consolidation could be attained by reducing structural public
expenditure. This variable seems to play a crucial role, at least in a first step, given its
importance in explaining the process followed by tax collections.
Finally, a restricted sample analysis (1964-1993) offers a somewhat different
picture, in that we find evidence of causality from revenues to expenditure in the short
term. This result confirms previous empirical evidence for similar sample periods
(González-Páramo, 1994) and supports the hypothesis that in the last years there has
been a change in the dynamic relationship between both variables as result of the
fiscal consolidation strategy implemented (based mainly on a drop in spending).
Additionally, this fiscal strategy might be behind the observed change towards strong
sustainability.
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APPENDIX A: UNIT ROOT TESTS
In table A.1 we summarise the unit root tests for the variables used in the
analysis. In none of the cases do the tests reject the null hypothesis of the existence of
one unit root for the fiscal variables. Since no constant or deterministic trend turned out
to be significant for tt, gt R or dt, the tests reject the null of the existence of two unit roots.
The tests performed on the debt process do not clearly reject the existence of a
constant and a deterministic trend. Thus, the ADF test does not offer conclusive results
about the existence of one or two unit roots in the process followed by this variable,
although it seems to favour the I(2) hypothesis. The Phillips-Perron method offers a
different view in that it rejects the null of two unit roots against the alternative of only
one unit root. However, given that dt can be considered as I(1), according to [1],  we
might expect bt to be I(2), or accordingly Dbt to be I(1). The lack of power of unit-root
tests, together with the difficulty of distinguishing between a I(2) process and a I(1)
process with drift and time trend, prevents us, for the moment, from drawing further
conclusions on this issue. Finally, GDP growth rate and inflation rate are, according to
the unit root tests, I(1) variables.
Table A.1: Unit root tests
I(1) vs. I(0)
ADF statistics Phillips-Perron statistics
at *at **at Z( at ) Z( *at ) Z( **at )
bt 0.92 -0.26 -2.46 2.07 0.77 -2.54
tt 3.53 -0.76 -0.99 4.35 -0.78 -1.19
gtR 1.38 -1.12 -0.93 2.30 -1.14 -0.39
dt -0.84 -1.45 -1.40 -0.82 -1.45 -1.31
Dpt -0.76 -0.87 -1.46 -0.92 -1.11 -1.49
Dyt -1.70* -2.61 -2.57 -1.41 -2.52 -2.79
I(2) vs. I(1)
bt -2.26** -2.59 -2.44 -2.83*** -3.19** -3.25*
tt -1.86* -3.34** -3.38* -3.94*** -6.47*** -6.48***
gtR -1.98** -2.46 -2.63 -2.97*** -3.73*** -3.92**
dt -3.16*** -3.10** -3.19 -5.25*** -5.18*** -5.27***
Dpt -3.44*** -3.42** -3.55* -5.96*** -5.90*** -6.08***
Dyt -5.95*** -5.84*** -5.76*** -7.24*** -7.17*** -7.26***
Note: The symbols *, ** and  *** denote rejection of the null at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels,
respectively. The number of lags used has been set to 1.
APPENDIX B: THE GREGORY AND HANSEN TEST (1996)
Gregory and Hansen (1996) propose a statistic that attempts to test the null
hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative of cointegration with a structural
break at an unknown point in time, and accordingly consider three possible models.
The first one is referred to as “level shift” (C), which is expressed as:
tttt eyDy +++= 2211 amm t [B.1]
where
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with [ ] meaning “integer part” of the argument inside. Thus, [B.1] aims to test whether
there is a change in the intercept term at the time of the shift. The second possibility is
called “level shift with trend” (C/T) with the form:
tttt eytDy ++++= 2211 abmm t [B.2]
The last model considered is known as “regime shift” (C/S) and takes the form:
tttttt eDyyDy ++++= tt aamm 2221211 [B.3]
These models are estimated recursively by OLS for all possible break points in
the interval t Î [0.15,0.85]. A sequence of ADF and Phillips Za and Zt residual-based
tests is computed, and they calculate the highest absolute value of the sequence. The
observation associated with this statistic is taken as the most probable break point.
More recently Fernández (1999) has tabulated the distribution for the Mean of
the ADF test (MeanADF) which was not originally tabulated by Gregory and Hansen.
This latter statistic could be used for testing a gradual change in the policy regime and
shows that this statistic has an acceptable power in finite samples. He also shows that
the test proposed by Gregory and Hansen has more power than the tests proposed by
Hansen (1992) and Hansen and Johansen (1992) (which we shall refer to later) in finite
samples for detecting parameter instability in cointegrated relationships, although all of
them have lower power the lower the sample period.
APPENDIX C: THE HANSEN TEST (1992)
This test also considers the possibility of a structural break at an unknown point
in time, although the null hypothesis is the existence of cointegration, in contrast with
the Gregory and Hansen test. Thus, the alternative is the existence of a structural
break. He considers the following relationship between the variables:
tttt uxAy 1+= [C.1]
with
)'','( 21 ttt xxx =
11 =tx
ttt uxx 2122 += -
He proposes four tests for instability. The first two are called Ft and SupF for the
alternative of a single structural break in At, which yields:
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where 1<t<n. These tests for parameter instability are based on the scores obtained
from the fully-modified residuals in the cointegrating equation and a long-run estimation
of the covariance matrix as suggested by Andrews and Monahan (1992), which uses a
prewhitened kernel estimator with a plug-in bandwidth.
The test Ft assumes that the break point is known and takes the expression:
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+
tu  are the fully-modified residuals from the estimation of [C.1], corrected by the
endogeneity bias of the regressors and 2·1Wˆ  is semi-parametric estimation of the long
term variance of u1t conditioned to u2t as suggested by Andrews and Monahan.
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Under the null of stationarity of At this contrast follows a c2 with degrees of freedom
equal to the number of cointegrating vectors. This test is similar to the Chow test, but
can only be used when t can be chosen independently of the sample size, and thus
has a low power. Therefore, when the break point is unknown Hansen proposes the
statistic
nt
nt
FSupF  sup
  / xÎ
=
where x is a compact subset of the interval (0,1). Hansen suggests considering the Fnt
statistics in the interval x = [0.15 , 0.85] in order to avoid distortions induced by break
points close to the first and final observations. The observation associated with SupF,
NsupF, can be interpreted as an indicator of the possible break point. The SupF
statistic has power against a swift shift in regime. On the other hand, when the
parameter shifts gradually over time, when At follows a martingale process, Hansen
suggests the MeanF statistic, which takes the form:
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The last test posed by Hansen is a LM one called Lc, which is appropriate when
the likelihood of parameter variation is relatively constant throughout the sample, and
takes the form:
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This test does not require specification of an interval for t a and can be taken as a
cointegration test with the null of existence of cointegration.
APPENDIX D: THE HANSEN AND JOHANSEN TEST (1993)
The Hansen and Johansen test is a recursive test that can be applied to the
maximum-likelihood method proposed by Johansen (1988,1991) for estimating
cointegrating vectors. It examines the stability of the eigenvalues associated with the
Error Correction Model, which measures the correlation between the vector of variables
in levels and in first differences.
A vector with p I(1) variables, whose dynamics are defined by a VAR, has the
form:
tttt ZXX eab +L+=D -1' ,             with t=1,…T  [D.1]
where
)'1,,,...,( 11 tkttt DXXZ +-- DD=
)',,...,( 11 YLL=L -k
Dt is a set of seasonal dummies, b is the cointegrating vector and a a vector of
adjustment coefficients for transitory deviations from the long-term relationship.
Regressing DXt and Xt-1 over Zt the residuals R0t and R1t are obtained. Using these
residuals the matrixes of moments and the eigenvalues are obtained:
'jtitij RRS å=
0ˆ...ˆ1 1 >>>> pll  and the corresponding eigenvectors )ˆ,...,ˆ(ˆ 1 pvvV =
by solving the equation
0 || 01
1
001011 =-
- SSSSl [D.2]
These eigenvalues and eigenvectors yield the estimation of b and the range of
the matrix of cointegrating vectors, r. They propose the following statistic:
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=
r
i i
i
t
t
ttHJ
1 )(ˆ1
)(ˆ1
ln)(
l
r
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where )(ˆ til  are the eigenvalues without restrictions obtained from [D.2] for the
subsample 1,…,t, while )(ˆ tir  are the eigenvalues obtained for the same subsample
according to:
0 |)()(')('| 01
1
00)(1011 =-
- bbbrb tStSStS t
or in other words, imposing the restriction that the cointegrating-vectors matrix in the
subsample 1,…t equals b, the cointegrating-vectors matrix for the whole sample. For
every possible break point, the HJ statistic is a LR test that compares the eigenvalues
obtained with and without restrictions, and follows a c2 distribution with (p-r)r degrees of
freedom. As t approaches the end of the sample, the statistic converges to 0, so it is
expected that its asymptotic power is greater for structural breaks in the beginning of
the sample.
In their paper Hansen and Johansen do not tabulate the empirical distribution
associated with these statistics, but they have recently been obtained by Fernández
(1999).
APPENDIX E: TESTS ON CHANGES IN THE ORDER OF INTEGRATION
Earlier work on this issue has been done by Leybourne, McCabe and Tremayne
(1996) and Maeso (1997). The former paper tests the null of I(1) with invariant
coefficient against the alternative of random coefficient. The latter tests the same null
against the alternative of a constant coefficient with a different level since a given date,
using rolling regressions. Here we follow Fernández (1999) and use a sequential
procedure consisting of estimating the following set of equations:
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where Dtt has been defined above. [E.1] aims to test the existence of one unit root in
both subsamples simultaneously. On the contrary, [E.2] and [E.3] impose I(1) in one
part of the sample. Accordingly, a sequence for the pseudo-t-ratios td1, td2, ta1 and ta2
associated with the coefficients for every possible break point is obtained. From every
sequence two summary statistics are calculated: the mean and the lowest one.
Following Fernandez these will be referred to as Suptd1, Meantd1, Suptd2, Meantd2,
Supta1, Meanta1, Supta2 and Meanta2. As before, the Sup statistics have power for a
unique break point, whereas the mean ones have power for gradual changes.
According to Zivot and Andrews (1992), the break point is associated with the
observation that corresponds to the Sup.
Fernández (1999) shows that the standard ADF behaves badly with changes in
the order of integration, and his results are thus summarised:
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· When the non-stationarity appears in the second part of the sample and there is no
stochastic trend, the statistics that show most power are Suptd1 and Meantd1,
followed by Supta1 and Meanta1.
· When there is a stochastic trend and the first part of the sample is I(0), the Suptd1
and Supta1 become significant.
· If the second part is I(0) and we cannot reject a stochastic trend then the Suptd2,
Meantd2, Supta2 and Meanta2 are expected to be significant.
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